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1. A multisystemic approach to language studies 
Language is a complex system1. As one of the main domains of human cogni-
tion, it represents distinctly and evidently a primacy of exposition, that is, it is 
the preferential way for thoughts to come out physically from mind roaming. 
Put in this way, it might seem that language holds a record of independence 
among the mind faculties for what concerns the direction that it follows, from 
inside to outside of mind. 
There is nothing more wrong than this assumption. In fact, as we will 
see, the complexity of language strongly relies on its dependence to the environ-
ment, understood as the set of ecological pressures and equilibria involved in 
human experiences, practices, and behaviors. The concept of complexity fine 
describes the nature of human language, particularly assuming an evolutionary 
perspective. Complexity does not mean that the linguistic phenomenon is hard 
to approach but rather that, comprehended as a multidomain set, it is formed by 
several subsets which are interconnected hierarchically and self-embedded, one 
in another in a recursive framework. Complexity is rather the theoretical filter, 
the passepartout, which permits to deeply investigate the evolutionary mosaic that 
presents human language as one of the outcomes.  
Crucial for this study is the role of centrality played by the environment 
in shaping human cognition and communicative forms. Although there are dif-
ferent scientific fields that question the nature of language abstracting from the 
ecological context, we believe that such approach alone does not fully cover the 
basic formulations regarding language evolution, for they rather offer a theoret-
ical model which fits only few aspects of the survey. The objective of the re-
search is neither to explain exhaustively all the facets of the polyhedron repre-
senting the reciprocal causation of binomials like environment-language and en-
vironment-cognition, for it would be impossible to successfully describe the 
phenomenon in absence of a broader analysis of updated scientific data. The aim 
of this paper, then, is to state that the study of the relations among scientific do-
mains concerning language studies is the right path to follow in order to better 
comprehend the nature of human language, its phylogenetic trend, and its mu-
tual dependence with the environment. The leading question hence would be: 
which hypothesis describes efficiently the relation between human language and 
the environment in its reciprocal dialectics of causation? In attempting an an-
swer, we will consider different queries concerning the relations between the 
scientific subjects, the relevant hypotheses proposed by the main areas and, 
where possible, the dialogue between opposite theoretical positions. The reason 
behind the topic and the methodology emerges from the need to shed light on 
 
1 The notion of complexity comes from the theoretical investigations of Edgar Morin. In this paper 
we will not cover the themes of his research; rather, we will adopt his methodology in approach-
ing complex systems systematically, understanding the considered phenomenon as a compound 
of different and structured layers organized in hierarchies. In borrowing few epistemological 
concepts on complexity, we refer to E. Morin, Method: Towards a study of humankind. The nature of 
nature, Peter Lang, New York 1992; E. Morin, Organization and complexity, in «Annals of the New 
York Academy of Sciences», 879, 1999, pp. 115-121; E. Morin, On complexity, Hampton Press, 
Cresskill (NJ) 2008.  
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different aspects of human nature and its ecological place. We believe that con-
ducting the research using language evolution as the main proxy will lead us to 
an improvement in understanding the degree of connection between human 
cognition, behavior, and the environment.  
The fact that different research fields can state something about the topic 
might discourage the research itself, since it would be extremely difficult to have 
the same properties that function unanimously in a shared multisystemic space. 
What works in a psychological horizon might represent a theoretical failure in a 
linguistic context; what is explainable by cognitive biology might not show any 
relevant corroboration in evolutionary anthropology. Nevertheless, when the 
scientific demand is to theorize the functionalities and properties of a complex 
phenomenon, the first necessity is to be aware that, ultimately, every formal the-
ory, or attempt of formalization, is necessarily partial. Scientific theories are sci-
entific if and only if they admit the possibility to be enhanced or even changed by 
different sibling formulations. Several philosophers of science, such as Karl Pop-
per, Thomas Kuhn, and Imre Lakatos, have spent rivers of ink on the ontologi-
cal validity of scientific formulations: for instance, Lakatos suggests that a theory 
B can substitute a theory A given the scenario where B includes all the central 
properties present in A, the core, and its formulation is able to provide inclusive 
explanations about events not described in A2. Blueprinting a Lakatosian re-
search program on language evolution and its relationship with the ecological 
pressures requires more than two theories to be considered: in fact, assuming 
the possibility to accurately summarize the main research programs on language 
evolution – and their elements of similarities and collisions – a quite hard de-
mand would be to present a virtuous hypothesis able to include more empirical 
elements in a wider theoretical formulation.  
From an evolutionary perspective, both Charles Darwin and Alfred Rus-
sel Wallace have remarkably debated on the role of natural selection played as 
factor in language evolution3. Within the same tradition of thought we witness, 
at least in the last thirty years, a continuity of the argument brought up by dif-
ferent scholars: some of them, such as Steven Pinker, Paul Bloom, and Ray 
Jackendoff, bear that language would represent an adaptive trait, resulted from 
the process of natural selection4; on the other hand, Marc Hauser, Noam Chom-
sky and Tecumseh Fitch suggest that certain traits of language evolved punctu-
ationally5 and rapidly in recent Homo sapiens evolution, by ecological constrains 
 
2 I. Lakatos, The methodology of scientific research programmes: philosophical papers, Vol. 1, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1978.  
3 We directly refer to C. Darwin, The descent of man and selection in relation to sex, John Murray, 
London 1871, and A. Wallace, The limits of natural selection as applied to man, in Contributions to the 
theory of natural selection. A series of essays, Macmillan, London 1870.  
4 The research conducted by Pinker, Bloom, and Jackendoff would require more space and a 
deeper analysis. In this place, we cite only few works that, in our opinion, are essential for a first 
comprehension of the topic: S. Pinker, The language instinct, William Morrow and Company, New 
York 1994; S. Pinker and P. Bloom, Natural language and natural selection, in «Behavioural and Brain 
Sciences», 13, 4, 1990, pp. 707-784; R. Jackendoff, Possible stages in the evolution of language capacity, 
in «Trends in Cognitive Sciences», 3, 7, 1990, pp. 272-279.  
5 M. D. Hauser, N. Chomsky, W. T. Fitch, The faculty of language: what is it, who has it, and how did it 
evolve?,  in «Science», 298, 2002, pp. 1569-1579; W. T. Fitch, The evolution of language, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2010.  
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which led to functional adjustments, such as a rewire of the human brain or 
genetic alterations6. Although the parties do not share several views, they both 
accept the primacy of biological modifications of natural selection, over those 
scholars who outlines the primacy of a cultural and gradual process in evolution, 
and specifically for the evolution of language. To avoid any misunderstanding, 
it should be noted that «any component of language, even the most novel and 
apparently adaptive, needs to be characterized within a context of historical con-
straints, deriving from developmental and phylogenetic constraints on form and 
physiology»7. 
Contrary to the researchers that confirm language as a product of exap-
tation8, rather than adaptation, Michael Tomasello and the sociopragmatic tradi-
tion hold that the human language emerges a cognitive property and, as a phy-
letic trait, it evolved from basic forms of gestural communication which conven-
tionalized as verbal language under a process of culturalization9. Tomasello ex-
plains such cognitive shift across several scientific works, shedding light both on 
ontogenetic and phylogenetic aspects of language, suggesting that language as 
such is nothing but the cognitive tool responsible for normativity in cooperative 
scenarios. Moreover, his ontogenetic studies show that communicative conven-
tions spring up during early ontogeny in social contexts involving mental simu-
lations, self-monitoring, and cooperative agency. The deep symmetry between 
ontogeny and phylogeny of language is quite evident, as it presents the same 
theoretical mechanism occurring in different intervals of temporality.  
 
The term punctuationally comes from N. Eldredge and S. J. Gould, Punctuated equilibria: an alternative 
to phyletic gradualism, in T. J. M. Schopf (ed.), Models in Paleobiology, Freeman Cooper, San Francisco 
1972, pp. 193-223.  
6 F. Suman, T. Pievani, The evolution of human language. An alternative scenario, in «Paradigmi», 2, 
2015, p. 173; N. Chomsky and R. Berwick, Why only us. Language and evolution, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge (MA) 2016.  
7 T. Fitch, Evolutionary Developmental Biology and Human Language Evolution, in «Evol Biol», 39, 2012, 
p. 614.  
8 The biological notion of exaptation is widely explained in: S. J. Gould and E. S. Vrba, Exaptation 
– a missing term in the science of form, in «Paleobiology», 8, 1982, pp. 4-15; S. J. Gould, Exaptation: A 
Crucial Tool for an Evolutionary Psychology, in «Journal of Social Issues», 47, 1991, pp. 43-65. It should 
be noted that authors like Tecumseh Fitch or Marc Hauser do not refuse the process of adapta-
tion in the evolution of language: rather, they accept the graduality of evolution but highlight 
that some traits evolved under a process of exaptation. It is useful to cite a passage from Fitch 
(2012, 615) to escape any doubt concerning the terminology on exaptation and the relative Gould-
ian nomenclature: «Exaptation captures the notion that evolved traits can change their function, 
being (in Darwin’s terms) co-opted from an old function to some new one. Constraints is a 
covering term for diverse factors that prevent natural selection from fully optimizing a given 
trait to its function, and that thus restrict, limit, or scaffold the course of evolution and the nature 
of evolved trait. Because of constraints, selection on one trait may lead to changes in other traits 
that are not adaptive, but are merely correlated with the selected traits. When such non-adaptive 
traits appear due to physical or developmental constraints, Gould & Lewontin suggested the 
term spandrels, by analogy to geometrically necessary aspects of architecture. Spandrels in the 
biological sense are non-adaptive by-products of developmental processes, sometimes present 
by physical necessity. Exaptation can occur in two forms. In the first, an adaptive structure con-
structed by natural selection for one purpose can be put to new use—a form of ‘‘adaptation 
recycling’’. In contrasts, type II exaptations co-opt previously useless spandrels for some use, 
giving rise to a true novelty».  
9 M. Tomasello, The cultural origins of human cognition, The MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 1999; M. 
Tomasello, Origins of human communication, The MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 2008.  
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Even if these two perspectives do not share the majority of assumptions, 
it is undeniable that the environment plays in both the crucial role of otherness, 
namely, the contingent and incidental factor that has to be present in order to 
let language emerge and evolve. Thus, a multisystemic approach to the topic is 
nothing but necessary and required, for it permits to navigate in the weaved map 
of cognition holding several and contrasting perspectives that present as former 
scientific exigency the investigation on human language in all of its facets. In this 
framework, the environment has many forms and faces: individuals live in a par-
ticular environment, affecting it, shaping it, and being shaped by it. Language is 
that particular tool that does not directly affect the ecological equilibrium; rather, 
it shapes individuals and groups incisively enough to assume the role of precon-
dition for the individual-environment mutual shaping to occur. The preferential 
methodology is the one that attempts to disclose such set of relations in an open 
and wide horizon of systems.  
 
 
2. Agency: cooperation in the environment.  
In large games, humans perform highly complex and joint behaviors in order to 
succeed. Paleontologists do not know exactly when to pose such cooperative 
turn in human phylogeny; however, archaeological records suggest that large-
game hunting was a regular practice around 400-200 Kya: hominins from the 
late Lower Paleolithic period used to hunt and butcher in a cooperative way, 
following ritual processes involving roles and a shared intentionality. To corrob-
orate such hypothesis, fossil records from the site of Qesem Cave in Israel 
demonstrate that the consumption of the fine parts of the pray proceeded with 
specific rituals and shared with all the members of the group10. To which degree 
human cognition had to evolve to successfully perform joint activities?  
This is one of the leading questions that accompany Tomasello’s psy-
chological research11. He believes that cooperation, understood as a unique so-
cial feature of the genus Homo, emerges in a social context from the capacity of 
inferring and recognizing mental states in individuals, either belonging or not to 
the same group. Further, he claims that language emerges through actions, that 
is, from a goal-directed joint agency performed by members of groups that share 
the intention to pursue jointly and strategically a high rewarded task. Language 
represents the communicative and cognitive tool that regulates simultaneous ac-
tivities with the most economic trend. In order to draw a strategic description of 
human cooperation, Tomasello states that:  
 
early humans «cooperativized» great ape individual intentionality into hu-
man joint intentionality involving new forms of cognitive representation 
(perspective, symbolic), inference (socially recursive), and self-monitor-
ing (regulating one’s actions from the perspective of a cooperative 
 
10 M. C. Stiner, R. Barkai, A. Gopher, Cooperative hunting and meat sharing 400-200 kya at Qesem Cave, 
Israel, in «Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America», 
106, 2009, pp. 13207.  
11 Above all, we refer to M. Tomasello, A natural history of human thinking, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge (MA) 2014.  
 
C. Pace, Soaked in language 
 





partner) which, when put to use in solving concrete problems of social 
coordination, continued a radically new form of thinking12.  
 
The quote proposed is one of the formulations of the «Shared Intention-
ality Hypothesis», a psychological theory proposed by Tomasello with the objec-
tive to outline the role played by coordination in social activities. The uniqueness 
of human coordinative ability concerns a structure built on joint goals and sec-
ond-person joint intentionality, which eventually evolved in a we-intentionality. It 
is gained a shared intentionality with the occurrence of two conditions: (1) every 
member of the group has a personal perceptual perspective and shares it with 
his fellows; (2) every member of the group benefits from the availability of fel-
lows’ perspectives, so the single member is able to mentally simulate everyone’s 
behavior. Other species are able to cooperate, but only humans do so with a 
high awareness of the social environment, that is, knowing that they – as indi-
viduals – are part of a wider social net where peers see them the same way. The 
outstanding feature of such behavior does not solely regard cooperation, but 
rather the way in which cooperation is presented; saying it differently, which 
shades of coordinative activities produce the higher outcome. In order to get the 
best reward, intentionality needs joint goals and joint attention to be socially in 
place, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically13.  
Joint goals presuppose individual roles, recursive mind reading, mutual 
knowledge and, usually, a common ground. Hunting scenarios are appropriate 
for our analysis, since respond both to phyletic and logic queries, namely, 
whether cooperation brings a relevant gain to the group and whether frame-
works of games are suitable to explain how sociality works. The stag hunt well 
represents the situation in which our ancestors had to develop finer foraging 
strategies, starting from mental simulation of the game process, assigned roles, 
and a protocol of joint focused actions.  
Brian Skyrms, a professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science at UCI, 
proposes the hunting party as example to explain different features of the evo-
lution of sociality14. Imagine that hunters have to decide the prey to hunt be-
tween a stag and a hare. While bagging a hare is quite easy and does not require 
more than a person, catching successfully a deer is not a simple practice even for 
two individuals. However, a stag is a more valuable prey than a hare. Skyrms 
suggests that both hare and deer hunting are Nash equilibria: in a scenario with 
two hunters, each individual best option is to hunt what the other hunts, mean-
ing, one will hunt the hare if the other hunts the hare, and will hunt the stag if 
the other has the same intention. Hare hunting presupposes almost zero risk, for 
it requires no cooperation. Nevertheless, such scenario forgoes the potential pay-
off of a successful stag hunt. The game proposes a scheme where the rationality 
of players is pushed to seek the scenario with the highest mutual benefit. Yet, 
individually, without sharing the hunting goal the parameter to take into consid-
eration is rather the personal risk. Strategic equilibrium occurs only if communi-
cative trades are performed between the fellows.  
 
12 M. Tomasello, A natural history of human thinking, cit, p. 33.  
13 Ivi, p. 44.  
14 B. Skyrms, The stag hunt and the evolution of sociality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004.  
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Hunters have to establish a certain degree of communicative conven-
tions, a set of practices comprehended unanimously and similarly among the 
group members, in order to strategically plan and coordinate the party. Skyrms 
identifies a theoretical solution in the signals game proposed by the philosopher 
David Lewis in his work Convention15. In a social interaction, the first need is to 
set a basic form of communicative trade based on something arbitrary; in this 
regard, a convention is nothing but «a special kind of Nash equilibrium in a game 
that models the relevant social interaction»16. Further, the requirement to be in 
a Nash equilibrium is that each individual in the same environment follows the 
convention. The formulation brings with itself two questions:  
- Where does a convention comes from?  
- How conventions are able to remain the same (fixed at first, and then 
culturally ritualized)?  
Specifically, we want to comprehend which features select and set the 
equilibrium, and which one conserves it. At a first glance, individuals must share 
the same expectations from the others, meaning, a form of shared knowledge 
must occupy the common ground of intentionality. In addition to that, an equi-
librium is affected by several factors, such as prior agreement, precedent, and 
salience:  
 
a salient equilibrium (Schelling’s focal equilibrium) is one that «stands out» 
to the agents involved for some reason or another. Salience is a psycho-
logical property, and the causes of salience are not restricted in any way. 
Prior agreement and precedent can be viewed as special sources of sali-
ence17.  
 
Tomasello and Skyrms use Lewisian logic since it well describes how 
communication is established during cooperation and before it is conventional-
ized. The American philosopher has provided in Convention an explanation con-
cerning the emergence of conventions using a signaling game. The game requires 
two players to succeed in understanding and sharing the semantics of signals. 
Despite the fact that receiver does not possess the same information as the 
sender, it can receive the set of signals sent by the sender. The equilibrium is 
gained when there is an accordance between sender and receiver. The game also 
comprehends strategies, and whether for every state there is optimality between 
the sender’s and receiver’s strategy, the combination of the two takes the name 
of signaling system.  
Since individuals have to take rational choices and infer by reasoning 
what the other is likely to think, probability occupies a central role in the game, 
for the essence of the game itself is to match a specific kind of meaning between 
sender and receiver18. The optimal match is gained when sender’s strategy is 
based on associate states with messages sent in that specific state, while the re-
ceiver’s one consists in understanding the signal of a specific state of nature as a 
 
15 D. Lewis, Convention, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1969.  
16 B. Skyrms, The stag hunt and the evolution of sociality, cit., p. 50.  
17 Ivi, pp. 51-52.  
18 D. Catteeuw, B. Manderick, The limits of reinforcement learning in Lewis signaling Games, in «Confer-
ence: Proceedings of the 13th Adaptive and Learning Agents workshop», 2013, p. 2.  
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particular act19. A convention then is made if a strict Nash equilibrium occurs, 
that is, when there is a semantic match between the parts. Theoretically speaking, 
we can apply signaling games’ frameworks to every domain of knowledge or 
complex systems, implementing more rules, agents, conditionals and backwards 
logical relations, such as counterfactuals20. For instance, social norms can be de-
scribed evolutionarily from game theory. The aim of an evolutionary approach 
to game theory is to find which kind of population’s dynamics leads to equilib-
rium in specific tasks. When cooperative strategies become conventional in a 
group, the rules that regulate these practices are called social norms.  
Concluding the paragraph, we would like to present a short, yet relevant, 
argument that will enrich the discussion on cooperation. Success in games re-
quires the ability to mentally represent all possible scenarios and relative impli-
cations, adopting mental constructions of future events. Regarding meta-repre-
sentations, Thomas Suddendorf and Michael Corballis suggest the term of mental 
time travel as a generative property which could represent a virtuous precursor 
and precondition to human language21. In particular, the recursive faculty of hu-
man language may be embedded with mental time travel in narrative represen-
tations: we refer to abstract complex scenarios, where social roles are assigned; 
or even predictions of future based on how individuals may react to incumbent 
situations. Mental time travels might be seen as former causation in human cog-
nitive evolution, where language occupies the role of a normative quality. As a 
factor of discontinuity between humans and great apes, mental time travels in-
volve some specific and unique cognitive features, such as episodic memory, 
perception, and rational reasoning. Such hypothesis seems to corroborate what 
we have tried to outline until now: there is a mutual shaping between cognition 
and the environment that evolved along human phylogeny and occupies the role 
of precondition for the emergence of language. This is supported by the fact that 
the hypothesis of mental time travels could be understood as a combinatorial 
property, that regulates how elements work and gain meaning through time. Se-
mantic space is acquired when events are associated with specific moments, 
memories, future forecasts, and conditional simulations.  
 
 
3. Language and distances: environmental grammatical dependences and 
the phyletic development.  
The way humans organize speech is not casual, but rather follows the direction 
of attention: human phylogeny suggests that food-foraging and tool-making 
were the very causal principles of cognitive revolution, where language had the 
 
19 In our opinion, the term shared semantics better describes what occurs between agents that co-
operate in a common environment. They benefit the same pragmatic space, which is the pre-
condition for mutual semantics to occur.  
20 These insights are some of the keystones of the Lewisian philosophy. Lewis has a large and 
fascinating philosophical production which covers the majority of philosophical subjects. His 
theoretical investigations are systematic and present fine argumentations useful to implement in 
and frame an evolutionary theory of communication. We cite: D. Lewis, Counterfactuals, Blackwell 
Publisher, Oxford 1973a; D. Lewis, Causation, in «Journal of Philosophy», 70, 1973b, pp. 556-
567; D. Lewis, Causal Decision Theory, in «Australasian Journal of Philosophy», 59, 1981a, pp. 5-
30.  
21 T. Suddendorf, M.C. Corballis, Mental time travel and the evolution of human mind, in «Genetic, 
Social and General Psychology Monographs», 123, 1997, pp. 133-167.  
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chance to emerge. Nevertheless, the activity to pay attention to something spe-
cific, rather than anything, cannot be taken for granted, for it has to deal with 
the genesis of the theory of mind, or even, in ontogeny, to the transition from 
pointing (deictic gestures) to proper speech.  
Specifically, humans distinguish themselves with their closest cousins, 
the great apes, in tasks involving gaze-detection and gaze-following. In a phyletic 
scenario, the cognitive split between us and apes could represent an adaptive 
feature and be responsible, or forerun, the linguistic mastering. How? The biol-
ogists Kobayashi and Kohshima gathered several proofs about the uniqueness 
of the human eye’s morphology in a comparative optical study among primates’ 
eye, where the results suggest that the singular shape of the human eye is the 
result of adaptations that led to the extension of vision, above all horizontal 
direction22. Further, while we observe that among primates a certain percentage 
of pigmentation in the sclera is present, humans have no trace of it. The attain-
able explanation regards the predation risk: during human evolution, the neces-
sity for gaze camouflage decreased, while the control of fire, tool-crafting, and 
gaze-signal systems emerged. The evident movement of the iris in the sclera 
could prove a crucial enhancement in human communication, beside language, 
just through the lack of different pigmentation in the scleral area. Gaze-signals, 
following the iris’ movements, allow all the individuals of a given group to focus 
on the same thing, to direct and share the attention towards a common goal:  
 
Co-operative and mutualistic behaviors might need refined communica-
tion systems, such as language to inform one’s intention to other mem-
bers of the group. The human eye, the large scleral area surrounding the 
iris and a great ability of eyeball movement, would have provided a 
chance for a drastic change from «the gaze-camouflaging eyes» into 
«gaze-signaling eyes» through a small change in scleral coloration. The 
SSI and WHR of human eyes are even greater that those of gorillas, the 
largest primate, which suggests adaptation for gaze-signal enhance-
ment23.  
 
It is likely that this particular trait evolved in function of a more permis-
sive habitat and opportune ecological pressures. Perhaps, the form of intelli-
gence involved in camouflaging upgraded is a safer environment, protected by 
strategic thinking and the ability to craft weapons, leading to a cascade of cogni-
tive enhancements such as cooperative behaviors and coordinative perfor-
mances. 
In this regard, communication represents a direct consequence in the 
phylogeny of cooperation and, as Michael Tomasello outlines, it belongs to a 
broader adaptive and evolutionary scenario. Pointing, and then pantomiming, 
appeared as relevant skills of coordination in a finer way, enhancing the process 
of collaboration24. Further, the unusual feature of informing others as a way of 
free support «may have arisen by processes of indirect reciprocity in which 
 
22 H. Kobayashi, S. Kohshima, Unique morphology of the human eye and its adaptive meaning: comparative 
studies on external morphology of the primate eye, in «Journal of Human Evolution», 40, 2001, p. 433.  
23 Ibidem; SSI stands for «index of scleral size», while WHR refers to the «width/height ratio» of 
the eye.  
24 M. Tomasello, Origins of human communication, cit., p. 324.  
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people sought to gain reputations as good collaborators»25. Indirect reciprocity could 
have been the evolutionary precondition of a proto-communicative structure, 
namely, expecting mutual help, cooperative, and informative expression, in a 
common-ground space, where individuals’ ability to read recursively mind states 
of others could have had its proper field of development. Tomasello believes 
that language is entirely built upon a shared psychological infrastructure which 
emerges in a conventional system based on deictic and iconic gestures. Panto-
miming represents a crucial leap in human cognition, since it involves symbolic 
representation and, in absence of pointing, concerns displaced referents.  
Linguistically, hierarchies in syntax are built upon a causal order: gram-
matic dominance could be rather represented as a describing process towards the 
object of the survey. In Tomasello’s theory of language, gestures correspond to 
specific grammatical entities: pointing evolved in demonstrative pronouns, and 
pantomiming are representations of nouns and verbs. Regarding demonstratives, 
the psychologist states:  
 
As an example, an especially interesting class of words, universal in lan-
guages, is that so-called demonstratives, which are often accompanied 
even today by pointing. In English, these are words such as this and that 
or here and there. The special nature of these words may be seen (as Witt-
genstein 1953 first noted) by thinking about how children might learn 
them. For words such as nouns and verbs we may, given the appropriate 
joint attentional frame, point to something and name it for a child and 
she will learn the name. But how might we use pointing to teach children 
the words this and that or here and there? The problem is that if we point 
to something in attempt to teach these special words the pointing is both 
part of the ostensive act intended to teach (to direct attention to the ap-
propriate referent) as well as the meaning itself – a peculiar situation that, 
miraculously, does not seem to confuse children at all. They must in 
some way understand the redundancy involved26.  
 
Thus, spatial and distance awareness were two former cognitive features 
which are fine represented with demonstrative pronouns, for they describe the 
direction and the position of the object of the speech. Although deictic gestures 
are still present after the shift from gesture-based communication system to a 
vocal-based one, they do not give more informative insights. Instead, iconic ges-
tures directly refer to the nature of the object of interest, as well as to the action 
itself: pointing to something in movement might refer to the movement itself, 
to the direction, to the color, or to its shape. Iconic gestures evolved in verbs 
and nouns for they give us the characteristics of the actions and indicate the 
object associated with the actions themselves. Such occurrence is possible also 
since pantomiming does not require a present referent.  
 
25 Ivi, p. 325.  
26 Ivi, p. 232. Michael Tomasello presents across his scientific work several philosophical insights. 
Amongst the other, we recall few texts which Tomasello uses a lot to theoretically describe the 
philosophical issues regarding language, cooperation, and the emergence of social behaviors: G. 
H. Mead, Mind, self, and society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1934; J. Searle, The construction 
of social reality, Free Press, New York 1995; W. Sellars, Empiricism and the philosophy of mind, 
Routledge, London 1963; L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical investigations, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1955.  
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In early ontogeny, humans learn a language progressively by using lin-
guistic constructions, which are acquired within their proper cultural environment. 
Under a process of sociogenesis, the underlying constructions of language 
turned into conventions27. Furthermore: «in this view, complex linguistic con-
structions are just another type of symbolic artifacts that human beings inherit 
from their forebears – although these artifacts are in some ways special as their 
systematic nature evokes from children attempts at categorization and schema-
tization»28. Children cognitive development is shaped by the activity of hearing 
sentences and abstract linguistic constructions from the speech. During ontog-
eny, children learn to use linguistic tools, which become more complex and ab-
stract as they grow: given standard situations, empirical studies show that chil-
dren relate themselves with the same scenarios using different syntactic forms, 
structured around a central core and, becoming cognitive sharper, constructions 
will enrich with more contextual details29. As they grow up, children master hol-
ophrases, verb island constructions, abstract constructions, and narratives. 
Around thirteen months of age, children are able to use basic gestures and vo-
calizations to communicate with adults, and start to adopt holophrases, which 
are nothing but simple linguistic conventions. Tomasello outlines five categories 
where children use the first linguistic structures, which usually represents causal, 
imperative, and declarative scenarios: the presence-absence-recurrence of some-
thing, such as people or events (gone, more, again); the exchange-possession of 
objects (give, share, mine); the movement-location of objects (up, down, here, outside); 
the states and changes of states and objects (hug, roll, want). Thus, holophrases 
are the first linguistic tools used by children, and consist of a linguistic unit which 
function as an entire speech act (play as I want to play)30.  
Between eighteen and twenty-two months of age, it is visible the shift 
from pivot-like constructions to verb-island constructions. Pivot constructions 
occur when children use a specific word to describe several scenarios or interact 
with adults: the linguistic expressions are thus built up around this specific word, 
and as the capacities become finer, a verb occupies the pivot position. Such hy-
pothesis, namely verb island constructions, bears that children, at twenty months 
circa, linguistically perceive reality through states of action, for they construct 
sentences mostly on verbs. Such syntactic structures present an abstract compo-
nent regarding participants involved in the action, instead the correspondence 
between the verb used and the action to describe is concrete and responds to 
syntactic rules of dominance.  
Abstract constructions and narratives presuppose a cognitive enhance-
ment. The capacity to create abstract schemes presupposes the insight that 
schemes themselves have their own reasons of existence, even without consid-
ering the specific words of the sentence: the upgrade from a verb island con-
struction to abstract construction in not the semantic aspect of the message, but 
rather the cognitive structures which mirror abstract linguistic frameworks, in a 
circular-recursive shaping of mind and language. Narratives occur when children 
 
27 M. Tomasello, The cultural origins of human cognition, cit., p. 135.  
28 Ibidem.  
29 M. Tomasello, First verbs A case study in early grammatical development, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1992b; M. Brooks, Early syntactic development, in M. Barret (ed.), The development of lan-
guage, Psychology Press, London 1999.  
30 M. Tomasello, The cultural origins of human cognition, cit., p. 137.  
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comprehend complex and abstract scenarios where participants are in relations 
which others or events and they are able to rationally understand it, even if the 
causal chain of events happens by chance. As a matter of fact, children can track 
consequent scenarios adopting phrasal connectors, such as since, therefore, however 
and so forth, and mentally backward retrace causations.  
Narrations are difficult tasks: they describe complex events framed in a 
multi-level structure and nested in a tapestry of relations. In this regard, prag-
matics is the first condition of existence for a successful narrative process, as the 
need of common ground, either linguistic or non-linguistic, prepare the field of 
the discourse. Time is a major constant in vocal description of events, followed 
by the ability to track all the actions of the actors, through time, and outline the 
relations among them. The ability to track actors in action requires the verbs to 
modify their description of the action, namely, to tense in favour of the time in 
which the event occurs. Thus, grammar is the principal cognitive tool that per-
mits an accurate description of events, where they occur, how they are presented, 
which are the agents of actions, the temporal extension and timing, in the most 
accurate and economic way. Moreover, grammar permits to track referents 
across events and actions, focusing on a particular behaviour, switching agents 
and outline specific relations among participants:  
 
This kind of extended discourse leads to the most complex, utterance-
level, syntactic constructions in a language, that is, those containing more 
than one event. […], extended sequences of discourse indicating multiple 
events – loosely organized and expressed across different intonation 
units – «congeal» over historical time in the discourse community into 
more or less tightly organized grammatical constructions expressed 
within a single intonation contour31. 
 
Narratives represent a social bonding mechanism, since they enlarge 
common grounds of stories that eventually become of public domain. Thus, 
Tomasello suggests that what occurred was a form of cultural and historical evo-
lution of language as a practice, rather than an alteration on biological traits of 
humans: in Tomasello’s theory of language, the historical-cultural evolutionary 
hypothesis is supported by the fact that speech emerges as a set of conventions, 
following Lewis’s theory of signaling games, as «prepacked» devices, usually 
called linguistic constructions. Linguistic constructions usually involve schemes 
that describe actions and agents. In such sense, grammar represents the faculty 
that associated subjects Xs which act on some Ys, or generate Ys, or are affected 
by Ys. In resonance with the theory of social construction through cultural de-
velopment, language is one of the phenomena that emerge because members 
interact with each other in describing their environment and the forces that 
shape and affect it.  
Such perspective of description of the world permits to make phrases 
where, although semantics crashes, syntax make us understand at least the trend 
of the sentence: if we say «the baf has lizzed a drinen kihn» we cannot get the 
meaning of the sentence fully, unless we formally correlate the nouns ‘baf’ and 
‘kihn’, the verb ‘to liz’ and the adjective ‘drinen’ with respective words in English. 
 
31 M. Tomasello, Origins of human communication, cit., pp. 286-287. 
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Nevertheless, language, in this case, in the form of English grammar, permits us 
to describe a non-existing word such as liz and decline it like a common regular 
English verb. The same could occur even if we establish that the past form of 
liz, instead, is ‘laz’, so the phrase would sound «the baf has laz a drinen kihn» 
and still having a clear trend in syntax. Despite the fact that these words are not 
present in the English vocabular set, we, as humans, are able to create conven-
tional languages upon our current one, where syntax and some grammatical tools 
(such as auxiliary verbs) remain unvaried. Moreover, Tomasello does not justify 
language as something innate, for language is a cognitive tool in a relation with 
the environment and itself. Artificial languages, in his view, justify the existence 
of language in a social and pragmatic perspective, namely, as a tool which adapts 
itself in all possible worlds. In addition to that, such hypothesis would explain 
why languages do change, but do not evolve. Philology shows perfectly that our 
English is not the language used by Shakespeare to write Hamlet, since forms and 
words changed historically. This process is usually called glossogeny of language.  
Still, the syntactic structure describe with X verb Y is shared among lan-
guages, because language basically depends on actions and events that do or do 
not occur:  
 
Language creation and change is what has been called a phenomenon of 
the «third kind». Like such other societal-level phenomenon as inflation 
and resource depletion, it is something that results from intentional hu-
man actions, even though no single individual or even group of individ-
uals intended for it to happen. Language creation and change result from 
the fact that human communication is open and dynamic, with interloc-
utors constantly adjusting to one another in order to communicate ef-
fectively and accomplish other social goals – relying to different degrees 
in different circumstances on different degrees and kinds of common 
ground32. 
 
Human communities reinvent language, receiving it from the past. As a 
dynamic system, superficial changes (words’ semantic space, for instance) may 
occur, enriching the vocabulary in consonance with the historical period. How-
ever, the syntactic core does not change and, apparently, never did. With the 
shift from a form of communication based proto-linguistic gestures to a vocal 
one, Tomasello claims that the order in which concepts are put together for the 
semantic outcome remains constant. The phyletic trait that evolves is the physi-
cal form in which communication in the genus Homo is established. Hence, vo-
cality has the primacy of efficacy to transmit a message. Using again narratives 
as sample, a task that young children acquire fast and without any effort is the 
capacity to nestle in the narration not only occurring events, but also mental 
states and intentions of participants. Using words such as gonna or could, the nar-
ration assumes shades that enrich and complicate the trend of the story. In a 
collaborative task, the theory of mind ensures that each participant is aware 
about the shared goal but does not take into consideration crucial factors like 
uncertainty, unpredictability, manipulation, and success’ probability. Instead, 
psychological states aware the participants about the odds that everything will 
 
32 Ivi, pp. 299-300.  
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lead to a positive outcome and give the possibility to enrich mental simulations 
concerning potential bad scenarios.  
 
 
4. No word where the norm lacks: the pivot.  
In different works, Martin Heidegger highlights the cruciality of language in de-
fining the existence of bodies33. We could heretically synthesise his thought with 
the following sentence: no things where the word lacks34. Nothing exists if the refer-
ence word is missing. Analogously, the philosophical view proposed above sug-
gests that language as a complex system emerges, or even occurs, for it attends a 
specific and peculiar environment; rather and further, language is the environ-
ment that individuals attend: individuals are soaked in language, even before their 
birth35. Evolutionarily, affirming that human language is a form of environment 
means that language is firstly a practice which exists for humans to perform it and, 
circularly, for it was available and after discovered by humans.  
This seems a logical paradox. How is it possible for humans to perform 
something ex novo if it must exist beforehand and, nonetheless, being the envi-
ronment humans are put in? Such question represents the philosophical core of 
the paper, since it outlines the nature of language as a threshold to cut through 
and, contemporarily, the practice to perform, in order to play an ecological part 
among the individuals of a given community, which is ultimately the social en-
vironment itself.  
The paleontological research of Ian Tattersall on the topic suggests that 
language had to be discovered by Homo sapiens, since the species presented all the 
morphological features to perform language before language was firstly used36. 
The Chomskyan tradition and latest biolinguistic interpretations of the subject 
endorse similar aspects37. Despite the elegance of the theory as well as the higher 
probability that there must be a certain degree of biological availability for the 
emergence of human throughout human phylogeny, we would rather support 
the hypothesis that language is highly affected by the environment and emerged 
in a dialectics of mutual shaping. Tattersall’s view is interesting, if we consider 
the discovery made by sapiens a rather enhanced form of self-awareness. Moreo-
ver, borrowing the Lacanian concept38 – without considering its psychoanalytic 
structure and consequences –, language is a specific environment, a cognitive 
tool that we share with individuals, that we perform, and nonetheless we are yet 
 
33 The literature on the topic is enormous. Since the aim is to use an Heideggerian formulation 
without considering an analysis on Heidegger’s thought, we just refer to M. Heidegger, Being and 
Time, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1962; M. Heidegger, M. Heidegger, What is Metaphysics, in D. F. 
Krell (ed.), Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, Routledge, London 1993, pp. 93-110.  
34 The formulation is simplistic and perhaps does not render justice to the Heideggerian deep 
philosophy. We functionally adopt the concept as a theoretical tool, using its syntactic, rather 
than conceptual, framework.  
35 We borrow this concept from J. Lacan, Petit discours à l’O.R.T.F. (1966), in Autres Ecrits, Edition 
de Seuil, Paris 2001.  
36 I. Tattersall, An evolutionary framework for the acquisition of symbolic cognition by Homo sapiens, in 
«Comparative cognition and behavior reviews», 3, 2008, pp. 99-114; I. Tattersall, Human evolution 
and cognition, in «Theories in Biosciences» 2010, pp. 193-201; I. Tattersall, Masters of the Planet: The 
Search of Our Human Origins, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2015.  
37 In particular, we refer to N. Chomsky, R. Berwick, Why only us. Language and evolution, The MIT 
Press, Cambridge (MA) 2016.  
38 See footnote 34.  
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performed by it. Language is a practice presenting individuals as objects and per-
formers, synchronously.  
Hence, considering the peculiar circularity of affection, we should not 
seek for an origin; rather, we should look for a feature, a pivot, on which language 
and environment reciprocally lay on. In paragraph 2 we outlined the importance 
of conventional language in cooperative scenarios like hunting parties. The phi-
losopher considered, Brian Skyrms, proposes a simple, yet convincing, explana-
tion about the success of joint activities: there must be a shared semantics among 
individuals, previous to any form of communication. Nash equilibria are gained 
when the stasis of the scenario requires a certain degree of cooperation in order 
to gain a favourable payoff. The hunt demands, then, a shared set of practices, a 
norm, which guarantees that the behaviour performed by one individual corre-
sponds to the one expected by the other, and vice versa. Games need participants 
to act rationally in activity with an unequivocal goal and, further, to monitor their 
behaviour is response to others’. Thus, connecting the dots, practices ground on 
a shared norm, and not on a common language, meaning, the linguistic tool does 
not emerge ex abrupto for it has a «launch» within the practice to follow: human 
language is nothing but a habit of the norm.  
Thus, language is the outcome of the shared practice where individuals 
cooperate following the same norm; once manifested different forms of com-
munication, the needs for an economic form of information trade is conven-
tionalized into language. Language exists for it exists the group and the group’s 
requirement to share intentions for pragmatic reasons.  
No word where the norm lacks. The norm is the pivot of sociality, and the 
very condition for language to exists. If it is true that humans are ontologically 
soaked into language, they are initially soaked into a variable horizon of norma-
tive events and practices. Without a norm, individuals do not comprehend each 
other and cannot, consequently, establish a communicative trade39. The norm 
exists prior to language. The peculiar public nature of language has a relevant 
presence in the late thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein. In the Philosophical Investiga-
tions he presents several paragraphs where he shows how considering language 
as a private phenomenon leads to a blind alley:  
 
243. A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, 
blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. 
We could even imagine human beings who spoke only in monologue; 
who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves. An explorer 
who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating 
their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these people's 
actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and deci-
sions.)  
But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down 
or give vocal expression to his inner experiences – his feelings, moods, 
and the rest – for his private use? – Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary 
language? – But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this 
 
39 This insight belongs, once again, to the philosophical investigations of David Lewis on the 
origin of conventionalized practices. The author justifies the emergence of language proposing 
a now-classic signaling game in his volume Convention.  
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language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; 
to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot under-
stand the language40. 
 
Wittgenstein’s critique is moved towards the Cartesian tradition which 
ultimately and univocally endorsed a separation between the layers of cognition, 
understood as a private space, and the external world. Wittgenstein’s will is to 
outline a theoretical mistake: language is not a private tool able to describe public 
situations, but rather a public feature that we, as humans, share in order to de-
scribe the private ways in which we experience the world:  
256. Now, what about the language which describes my inner experi-
ences and which only I myself can understand? How do I use words to 
stand for my sensations? – As we ordinarily do? Then are my words for 
sensations tied up with my natural expressions of sensation? In that case 
my language is not a «private» one. Someone else might understand it as 
well as 1. – But suppose I didn't have any natural expression for the 
sensation, but only had the sensation? And now I simply associate names 
with sensations and use these names in descriptions41. 
 
In our opinion, the exposition given by Wittgenstein sheds light on the 
right hermeneutical mechanism involved in understanding which relation stands 
between language, human experience, and the environment. What scholars usu-
ally name «private language argument» in fact presents the need to invalidate the 
hard dualism in favor of a more open and mutual dialectic of influence between 
the parties42. If language is public, Wittgenstein asserts, then what we trade are 
not linguistic enunciates – for they are the way in which we express concepts – 
but rather the set of perceptual experiences, the practices, that we frequently 
attend. Nonetheless, enunciates are available to be traded for they are linguistic, 
and semantics occurs since language is ultimately intersubjective: meanings, 
then, are mediated by the linguistic environmental web which has as nodes all 
the individuals involved in the communicative exchange. Yet language, as we 
pointed above, is the preferential cognitive tool which permits such operation: 
language contains the public information, for language is ontologically public, 
and not only contains the message, but it is the message itself, namely, the lin-
guistic form of information is in the very information, the message to exchange 
is represented by the communicative form. If it is true that language mediates 
information, the medium, comprehended environmentally, is the message43.  
Further, if language occurs synchronically as an act and as the ecological 
equilibrium where the act occurs, it is rather comprehensible as an experience. 
Phenomenologically, we experience language starting from the (linguistic) event 
 
40 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1986, pp. 88-89.  
41 Ivi, p. 91.  
42 G. P. Baker, The private language argument, in «Language & Communication», 1998, pp. 325-356; 
S., Candlish, Wittgensteins Privatesprachenargumentation, in E. von Savigny (ed.), Wittgensteins Philoso-
phische Untersuchungen, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1997, pp. 143-165; S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules 
and Private Language, Blackwell, Oxford 1982.  
43 The conceptual link between the impossibility of privacy in language and its relationship with 
a shared semantics is inspired also by the consideration of M. McLuhan, Understanding Media: The 
Extension of Man, Routledge, London 1964.  
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we attend and, crucially, the way is which we perceive the event depends on the 
personal disposition of participation. John Dewey magnificently explains such 
mechanism in the psychological field, coining the term of «organic circuit»44. The 
relation between stimulus and response must be searched in the juncture of the 
parts:  
 
It is a question of finding out what stimulus or sensation, what move-
ment and response mean; a question of seeing that they mean distinction 
of flexible function only, not of fixed experience; that one and the same 
occurrence plays either or both parts, according to the shift of interest; 
and that because of this functional distinction and relationship, the sup-
posed problem of the adjustment of one to the other, whether by supe-
rior force in the stimulus or an agency ad hoc in the center of the soul, is 
a purely self-created problem45. 
 
By means of this mechanism, there is organicity among the systems: the 
complexity of the linguistic phenomenon acquires clarity within the shaping 
mechanism of mutuality between stimulus and response. Again, the organic fea-
ture occurs since language itself is included in a set of normative practices where 
individuals are soaked. The systematic relation among the philosophical terms 
mirrors what happens at a systemic level in the scientific field. If language 
grounds on a norm, which nature has it? How this language springs up in a cir-
cular relation of shaping?  
Beside the hunt theory which, as we saw above, endorses the hypothesis 
that hunt parties are the social events responsible for the emergence of language, 
another scientific path suggests different environments, different subjects, and 
different norms. Moving within a Lakatosian framework, we are still looking for 
a relevant hybridization of theories, able to finer describe the relation between 
the elements mentioned. A fascinating hypothesis comes from the anthropolog-
ical field and support the idea that, ultimately, language does not regard solely a 
horizon of masculinity, but rather it could come from the circular relation be-
tween maternal cares and babies in phylogeny. Regardless the data, the former 
insight to keep in mind is the mechanism described by Dewey, which finds a 
scientific corroboration in the principal properties of the Extended Evolutionary 
Synthesis such as niche construction, phenotypic plasticity, constructive devel-
opment, and reciprocal causation46. The plasticity of mind, its relationship with 
a plastic environment, and the prolonged development of juvenile traits, repre-
sent few of different insights proposed by a Florida State University professor, 
the anthropologist Dean Falk, who gives mothers the role of centrality for the 
 
44 J. Dewey, The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology, in «The Psychological Review», 3(4), 1896, pp. 
357-370.  
45 Ivi, p. 364.  
46 K. Laland, T. Uller, M. Feldman, K. Sterelny, G. Muller, A. Moczek, E. Jablonka, J. Odling-
Smee, The extended evolutionary synthesis: its structure, assumptions and predictions, in «Proceedings of the 
Royal Society: Biological Sciences», 282, 2015, 20151019; J. Odling-Smee, K. Laland, M. Feld-
man, Niche construction: the neglected process in evolution. Monographs in Population Biology, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 2003.  
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occurrence of human language47. Since neoteny is a major factor of human de-
velopment throughout phylogeny, she claims that the evolutionary tractions re-
sponsible for the emergence of human language must be searched in the relation 
between mothers and children, and temporarily before any form of protolan-
guage.  
Specifically, she locates in motherese, the universal musical way in which 
mothers talk to infants, the first forms of successful linguistic construction, 
where successful strongly depends on the activity of care, which we comprehend 
as the set of normative practices responsible for the public and environmentally 
occurrence of linguistic communication. She also claims that:  
 
One reason we’ve misunderstood the role of motherese in the develop-
ment of language may have to do with assumptions about gender. Since 
at least Charles Darwin’s time, men have been viewed as prime evolu-
tionary movers because of their hypothetical focus on hunting, tool pro-
duction, and warfare. More recently, women have also become cele-
brated as evolutionary movers because of their roles in gathering food 
and helping daughters raise offspring48. 
 
What is fascinating about Falk’s hypothesis is that it ultimately relies on 
paleontological data and anatomic issues: the fossil record tells us that the asso-
ciation between the standing posture and childbirth had to arrange in order to 
lower the high risk of mortality of mothers in giving birth with a narrowing birth 
canals, resulted from the upright walking to too-developed infants. Hence, se-
lective pressures started to be in favor of the birth of less developed infants. 
Nonetheless, «because of their physical immaturity, these newborns lacked the 
ability to cling unsupported to their mothers, a skill that monkey and ape infants 
very quickly develop»49. Such deficit led mothers to lay down the infants during 
foraging or gathering tasks: the physical separation, eventually, had to be filled 
up by an exosomatic replacement, by a non-physical tool, able to link mothers 
and children in a non-tactile context50. Language might have emerged as this 
specific feature, ultimately from maternal cares.  
 
 
5. Conclusion.  
No language where the relation lacks. The philosophical category of relation is the 
one considered in the first paragraph to justify the need to put different systems 
and disciplines in dialogue. It is evident that the multisystemic approach is noth-
ing but an equilibrate ecology of domains, which share several spaces and none-
theless needs an independent dialectics among them. Considering similar 
 
47 D. Falk, Prelinguistic Evolution in Early Hominins: Whence Motherese?, in «Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences», 27, 2004, pp. 491-503; D. Falk, Finding our tongues: mothers, infants, and the origins of lan-
guage, Basic Books, New York 2009.  
48 D. Falk, Finding our tongues: mothers, infants, and the origins of language, cit., p. x.  
49 Ibidem.  
50 Dean Falk does not adopt the term exosomatic. However, we believe that the adjective repre-
sents the best formulation to explain the filling feature and the physical gap as well. The gradient 
of separation was necessary for language, as a practice, to fill in. The theoretical suggestion comes 
from the reading of C. Sini, Il potere invisibile, in «Noéma», 4(2), 2013, pp. 1-25.  
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phenomena in linguistics and comparative psychology does not reduce the pre-
cision of the analysis nor confound the possibility to dig deep in each subject; 
rather, it is the conditio sine qua non for the study to be prolific and interesting. The 
pragmatic infrastructure brilliantly proposed by Wittgenstein regarding the pub-
lic nature of language would remain a theoretical thesis without a robust corrob-
oration in the field of hard sciences. The endorsement of a dialogue between the 
sciences and philosophy is, in fact, one of the former needs of this paper. Col-
lecting data would be useless, if considered in a short-term view. The hypothesis 
we suggest, instead, is a dialectics within a hybrid environment structured, as 
Charles Sanders Peirce would say, in the long run: if it is true that analyses must be 
made in fractions, knowledge cannot be parceled out.  
  For these reasons, we collected different perspectives concerning lan-
guage. The motivation might be synthesized with a general but appropriate case 
of study. In the paleontological perspective, language is a cognitive feature not 
so easy to study, as it does not present any access from the fossil record. None-
theless, it is possible to forecast how language shaped throughout evolution, in 
relation to different available empirical study based on archaeological evidence, 
such as stone industry and symbolic manifestations. Such process of study in-
volves the so-called proxy systems, namely, adopting a subject and its data as a 
filter to approach another. However, we were not solely interested in such dy-
namics; rather, we wanted to study language as proxy of the proxies, as the spe-
cific cognitive domain which presents an external as well as internal framework 
that influences all the sibling domains.  The aim, then, is to be aware that lan-
guage is the exomorphic prothesis that let humans structure the world, starting 
from early ontogeny, in distances and familiar orders; saying it differently: 
«speaking in “material” language it means that the world, i.e., the total of observ-
able events, shows structural uniformities, manifesting themselves by isomor-
phic traces of order in the different levels and realms»51.   
In this theoretical horizon, we believe that the ontogenetic investigations 
of Michael Tomasello are decisive for the cause. In our opinion, Tomasello 
adopted different philosophical positions and implemented them in scientific 
and comparative studies to better understand the reciprocal correlation between 
empirical and theoretical approaches. His uses of the evolutionary game theory 
and the private language argument are a perfect example of this dialectics, since 
he poses such subjects in ethological and anthropological grounds strincto sensu. 
The relevancy to study the social agency, both philosophically and biologically, 
requires diachronic and synchronic layers of study which nonetheless weave to-
gether: conducting comparative studies between young children and young 
chimpanzees is fruitful if the corroboration in philosophical theories is evident 
and not so hard to see. Why so? Since the practices where the systems are in-
volved take as virtuous sample human language in a shared environment of the 
analysis. Further, language itself is that specific human cognitive feature that is 
representable through distances, or rather through the separation between the 
subject and the object/event. Language is the environment where humans are 
 
51 L. Von Bertalanffy, General System Theory. Foundations, Development, Application, George Braziller, 
New York 1968, p. 49.  
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soaked in and by which humans interact with each other. It is, then, the condi-
tion of existence of an ecological and rational agency.  
